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In 1848, commenting on the quashing of the Viennese popular uprising against the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Karl Marx predicted the only way the ‘bloody birth throes of the new 
society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, [would be through] revolutionary 
terror’.1 Marx’s pessimistic words evoking the Terror of 1793-4, with its mass executions 
across France, took on new meaning in twentieth-century China. After a long civil war, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalist army and established the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in autumn 1949. During the early years of the PRC, the CCP 
employed total terror in Marx’s sense.  First, as a means to bring about revolutionary change; 
then to create a new social reality; finally to guard the ‘fruits of revolution’ against 
reactionary forces. In this process, the use of violence was justified over and over again and 
became common coin of social experience in the early PRC. For Mao Zedong and many top 
CCP leaders, ‘power grows out the barrel of gun’ and the revolution had to be maintained 
with those weapons. The use of violence was seen as necessary.  
 
After the CCP seized power in 1949, remnants of the Nationalist army as well as hostile local 
forces staged fierce resistance across the country. For the new and fragile CCP regime, 
repression and terror were essential instruments to guard their newly gained power as well as, 
at the same time, to destroy the ‘old’ and to make a ‘new’ society free of the ‘evil remnants’ 
of the past. Together with the counter-revolutionary as well as the ‘bad’ elements, landlords 
                                                          
1 Karl Marx, ‘The Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna,’ Neue Rheinische Zeitung (November 1848), 
quoted in Michael Evans, Karl Marx (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 127. 
 2 
and rich peasants were classified as enemies of the people. They were to be eliminated at any 
cost. ‘Be ruthless and be tough’, ‘To strive one must kill’, for Mao there was no middle 
ground. Common people were encouraged to take up violence against their fellow 
countrymen.  
 
Between 1950 and 1953, the CCP launched the Land Reform in the Chinese countryside and 
the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries throughout China. The top leadership 
urged local cadres to ‘not fear executing people’ and to punish those who were too lenient 
and practiced peaceful land reform. Killing quotes were handed down. In 1951, at a February 
CCP Central Committee meeting, it was agreed that one out of every thousand should be 
killed. A month later, when speaking about the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries 
campaign in big cities, Mao used the metaphor of ‘blast rain’: ‘killing Counter-
Revolutionaries should be fast and thorough like blast rain. We must kill a huge numbers of 
them,’ he said.2 Within one year, millions of people were charged as counter-revolutionaries. 
They were either executed, imprisoned, or controlled. According to official estimates, 
712,000 ‘counter-revolutionaries’ were executed, 1,290,000 were imprisoned, and 1,200,000 
were subject to control at various times.’ But both Yang Kuaisong and Frank Dikötter argue 
that the actual number of executions was much larger than the reported 712,000.3 My recent 
archival research also shows that in subaltern regions such as Guizhou and Sichuan in the far 
southwest, the number killed far exceeded the quota handed down by the CCP Central 
Committee. In the heat of the killing, countless ordinary civilians were stirred up to violence. 
                                                          
2 ‘Chairman Mao’s instruction to Comrade Huang Jing on supplement plan for Tianjin’, from Western Sichuan 
Party Committee Archive, file CX1-78, p. 12. 
3 Yang Kuaisong, ‘Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries’, The China Quarterly 193 
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Revolutionary upheaval led to turmoil and lawlessness. Some used suppression of counter-
revolutionaries as a way to settle personal scores. For others, killing became a job to do or, 
indeed, a habit. In some parts of the country, killing was undertaken at such speed that there 
was not enough time to determine who was counter-revolutionary or not. After thousands 
were killed, their crimes, as well as often their names, were invented to pass the inspection 
from the party. Physical torture such as burning, limb amputation, hanging, and beating were 
also widely used prior to the actual killing.4 In Guizhou’s Huishui County, a man named Xie 
Caoxiang was arrested simply because he had visited a landlord in the same village. Being 
charged with the crime of liaising with counter-revolutionaries, he was repeatedly hanged and 
beaten. Eventually he died while his body was hanging on a pole.5 The violent atmosphere 
incited fear as well as rage. In Western Sichuan, at a public trial of a counter-revolutionary, 
the angry crowds jumped on the accused. After repeatedly beating him with wooden clubs 
and stone, in the chaos that followed the poor man had his eyes gouged out.6  
 
In rural China, Land Reform provided villagers the context to overthrow the landlords and 
takeover their properties. The sins of the landlords, as well as the rich peasants, were not 
merely being counter-revolutionary but also being rich. Once the Confucian moral framework 
was removed, a common moral and cultural heritage shared by majority of population living 
in China, rural Chinese villages quickly turned into what Hannah Arendt called ‘the 
                                                          
4‘Chairman Mao’s edict on the killing quota, 20 April 1951’, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, 
File CX1-834, pp. 75-7; South-western Bureau’s report on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries 
campaign and public security work, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-837, pp. 105-8. 
5 The Public Security of South-western China’s report on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries campaign, 
from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-839, pp. 227-9. 
6 Western Sichuan Public Security Bureau’s report on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries campaign, 
from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-843, p. 98. 
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atmosphere of disintegration’.7 All of a sudden, the old rule of the world had ceased to apply. 
Gone with it was the moral balance between right and wrong and between good and evil. 
Some interpreted Revolution in their own light. In many areas, the Land Reform turned out to 
be an exercise in looting others. Hatred began to play a central role in everyday human 
interaction as well as in public affairs. Everyone was pitted against everybody else, most of 
all against their next-door neighbours, their fellow villagers. Many villagers took up violence 
in almost medieval fashion. In central and south China, for example, under the disguise of the 
Revolution or the Land Reform, the bloody feudal style of clan fighting was rife. Hundreds 
indeed thousands were brutally murdered as result. Protected by the local command of the 
Public Security Police or village militia, known as the Peasant Association (nonghui), 
villagers of one clan openly robbed fellow villagers from another.8 In addition to landlords 
and rich peasants, many middle-level peasants were also targeted. In China’s southwest, in 
Yunnan province’s Zhanyi County, seventy villagers were tortured to death within twenty 
days during the Land Reform in 1951. One landlord was beaten to death simply because a 
fellow villager wanted his trousers.9 In Guizhou province’s Wuchuan County, a region with a 
predominantly Miao and Gelao ethnic population, a seventy-year-old local peasant Zhang 
Baoshan was butchered after had been falsely classified as landlord in the Land Reform in 
1951. His two sons sought revenge for their father’s death. One son was caught and hacked to 
death by two fellow villagers with an axe, the other son Zhang Ren’an was besieged by a 
group of revolutionary activists in the village and then hanged. After Zhang Ren’an’s death, 
                                                          
7 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, second edition (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 268.  
8 The CPPC and the Southwest Bureau’s instruction on how to carry out Land Reform and Tax collection work, 
from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-882, p. 16. 
9 The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Southwest Bureau’s instruction to carry out Land 
Reform, 1950–1952, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX 1-882, pp. 16, 21, 156-58, 284-
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they chopped off his tongue and sexual organ and burned his body. The rest of the family was 
also arrested and brutally tortured by local cadres and villagers.10 In some cases, the party had 
to intervene to save landlords from sheer butchery, though killing and looting were allowed 
as long as they were done in what, according to the authority, was labelled a civilized manner. 
In Southern Sichuan’s Zizhong County, for example, during the Land Reform more 400 
people were beaten to death within 10 days. Most of those being killed were not landlords or 
counter-revolutionaries. They were beaten to death simply because someone else in the 
village hated or envied them. When the local authority was alarmed to the seriousness of the 
situation, instead of mediating, they instructed villagers: ‘Don’t kill anyone in broad day 
light’, in other words, killing was allowed as long as it was done secretly or in the dark. 11 In 
parts of Guangdong, which were historically the base for revolutionary guerrilla fighters, 
after Mao issued instruction to speed up the pace of Land Reform, killing had become so 
uncontrollable that eventually its extent even alarmed the Central China Party Committee.12  
 
For some local officials, the use of violence also became a habit, an obligation, or a pathway 
to promotion. A student from the elite Tsinghua University in Beijing sent to the south to 
assist Land Reform and tax collection was so shocked by the sheer scale of violence in the 
countryside that he wrote a letter to the Beijing Municipal Government raising serious 
concerns. According to him some village officials in rural Zhejiang tortured people routinely 
                                                          
10 The Southwest China Public Security Bureau’s instruction on how to carry out the Campaign to Suppress 
Counter-revolutionaries, 1950–1952, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX 1-839, pp. 127-
8. 
11 Western Sichuan Party Committee’s report on Land Reform, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, 
File CX 1-884, pp. 32, 38-9. 
12The CCCP’s instruction regarding the problems during the Land Reform, from Western Sichuan Party 
Committee Archive, File CX1-886, p. 6. 
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in order to secure their position: they arrested or tortured villagers when they could not 
collect enough grain to meet the government’s tax quota. When being challenged, they 
replied: ‘our job is to meet the target. We will have remorse later.’ As result, majority of 
villagers lived in fear and horror. ‘What kind of revolution is that?’ this student asked.13    
 
As landlords were being killed or arrested, their properties were to be ‘distributed’.  Villagers, 
encouraged by local officials, rushed to chop down trees as they now belonged to the public. 
The logs were sold for profit to boost local funds. The authority tried to stop the unrestricted 
logging leading to clashes with villagers. In addition, villagers from different villages fought 
each other to secure more logs, thus more profits. This often led to further bloodshed. 14  
 
Such violence was ubiquitous in regions of mixed populations such as in Gansu and Ningxia, 
where since the Manchu conquest in the 18th century, the ethnic Hui and the Han lived next to 
each other under the imperial rule. At the eve of Liberation, their fragile or (perhaps) artificial 
sense of solidarity — ‘All under the Heaven’ as it was labelled in imperial China — 
evaporated. As what happened with Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia in the late 
1980s, ethnic hatred and violence soon followed. This quickly escalated into spontaneous 
pogroms. In Gansu province’s Linxia region in the northwest, the local authority fell in the 
hands of the Han officials who were seconded here from other parts of China. The local 
Public Security office too was dominated by the Han. In the name of ridding the area of 
bandits, they openly arrested and tortured a huge number of the local Hui population. One 
                                                          
13 The CCCP and the Southwest Bureau’s instruction on how to carry out Land Reform and Tax collection work, 
from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-882, p. 21. 
14 The CCCP’s instruction regarding the problems during the Land Reform, from Western Sichuan Party 
Committee Archive, File CX1-886, pp. 110-2. 
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night at the regional Revolutionary Political Department office, eight local Huis froze to 
death during detention. After they died, their bodies were openly abandoned in the nearby 
wasteland. The incident caused a huge public outcry and a riot broke out. Local bandits 
stirred up public anger, and recruited an army of 8,000 Hui ‘rebels’ to wage a war against the 
communist officials and armies as well as the local Han population. More than 400,000 of the 
local population were implicated in this ethnic massacre. In chaos, thousands, both the Han 
and the Hui, were brutally murdered. To escape the massacre between 40 to 50,000 Hui fled 
to what is now called Inner Mongolia in the PRC.15  
 
In Gansu province’s Guiyuan, now under the administration of Ningxia Hui autonomous 
region, ethnic conflicts dated back to the warlord period. After the Communist Liberation, to 
reduce financial and administration burdens, the region was forced to be integrated with 
another nearby region. The majority of the local population, both the Han and the Hui, 
refused the amalgamation. A major revolt broke out. The populace tried to disarm the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. In chaos that followed, some PLA soldiers killed 
one of the civilians. This stirred up further violence. The civilians turned on the regional CCP 
head. After repeatedly kicking and beating him, they tied him up and used him as bargaining 
chip to deal with the authorities. When the authorities refused to listen to their appeal, they 
turned on each other: the Huis took up violence against the Hans, and the Hans seized 
weapons to kill the Huis.16   
 
                                                          
15 The CCCP, the PLO, and the Public Security’s instruction on eliminating bandits and spies, from Western 
Sichuan Party Committee Archive File CX1-857, pp. 19-20; The CCCP and the CCCP United Front’s 
instruction on works in the ethnic regions, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, CX1-879, pp. 3-7. 
16 The CCCP and the CCCP United Front’s instruction on works in the ethnic regions, from Western Sichuan 
Party Committee Archive, File CX1-879, pp. 15-6. 
 8 
In China’s far southwest, prior to the Communist Liberation, Xikang province, now part of 
Sichuan, had been the territory controlled by the warlord Liu Wenhui. Historically on the 
periphery between the Chinese empire and the Himalaya kingdom of Tibetan, the region was 
of strategical importance both militarily and commercially. In the 18th century the Manchus 
had pacified these regions. After the fall of the imperial rule, it felt into the iron grip of the 
warlord. During the Manchu rule as well as under the warlord, the Han Chinese, the Tibetans 
as well as some nomadic tribes were integrated. They traded with each other as well as 
married each other. Prior to any substantial settlement, the nomadic Lolo tribes had been 
moving back and forth in these regions, and occupied different hills. Trade in merchant goods 
as well as opium allowed settlements to flourish. The Lolo tribes soon learnt that they could 
make a living from the Han and Tibetan merchants as their caravans had to pass through their 
hills. From the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of Han villagers moved there to 
cultivate the cash rich opium crops as the Manchu government imposed a ban on opium in 
the Chinese heartland. They rented hills from the Lolo tribes on which to grow opium, and in 
return the Han villages paid the Lolos in silver, food, and sometimes weapons. This was not 
without conflict, but there was a general understanding and agreement between all groups 
that as long as the Han as well as the Tibetans kept the Lolo in supply of silver, food and 
weapons, the Tibetan and Han were allowed to trade and the latter to grow their opium. This 
continued to be the case after the warlord Liu Wenhui took over the region. Liu was one of 
the ‘opium lords’, who profited greatly from the illicit drug trade. Under him opium became 
the major life blood for the region.  
 
The Communist Liberation, however, broke down the existing harmony resulting from the 
economic system in the region. The new freedom became an open invitation to violence. As 
soon as the former ruler – the warlord – was obliterated, so too were the old rules. Now the 
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warlord was gone, lawlessness prevailed. Bandits – many of them were opium lords – as well 
as remnants of the Nationalist army took advantage of the situation, threatening the CCP 
authority as well as the civilian population. To rid the region of bandits was also interpreted 
as a call to rid the area of opium, suppressing the opium trade. As the opium fields were 
wiped out, the new Communist authority also hunted down all opium farmers and traders. 
The Lolo, who were the previous possessors of the hills and had weapons, were classified 
either as landlords or counterrevolutionary bandits. To start with, the Lolo understood this 
meaning that the Han had broken the rules governing their relationship. In response, they 
blocked trading routes, looted caravans carrying essential supplies, and massacred the Han 
villagers. Fearing for their lives, and in panic, the remaining Han population began to flee. 
Zhaojue, the capital of Xikang, turned into total chaos. Instead of mediating between these 
different groups, the CCP officials, most of them were Han from elsewhere in China, began 
treating all of the Lolo tribal chiefs as bandits.17 As these tribal chiefs were arrested or 
beheaded, the different Lolo tribes were reorganised into ONE group with the NEW ethnic 
label ‘Yi’. As Yi, these different tribes came under the new leadership of the CCP with Mao 
as their superior head.  Ethnic hatred, previously unknown to the region, became a living 
reality. The chaos soon spread across Xikang. It continued into the late 1950s. Although 
Xikang was merged to become part of Sichuan province after 1955, it took nearly 10 years 
for the CCP to finally consolidate its rule in the region. In the process, the CCP authority 
gradually isolated the Yi population into the hills around Zhaojue. The Lolos, the former 
possessors of a range of different hills, had since been turned into a permanent underclass 
with their new ethnic label Yi. 
 
                                                          
17 Xikang provincial party committee’s instruction regarding the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries 
campaign, From Xikang Regional Party Committee Archive, File JK1-418, pp. 19-22. 
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The ever-growing chaos in Xikang, as well as its geographic position at the periphery of 
China provided the authorities a further context to introduce hard-line approach. In 1954, in 
two villages in the suburb of Xichang—the place of the CCP’s regional authority 
headquarter—hundreds of innocent villagers were arrested. They were interrogated and 
tortured until they were forced to admit they were counter-revolutionary bandits.18 
 
While the chaos in Xikang, coupled with violence, persisted into the late 1950s, for most of 
the rest of China, the Land Reform and the Campaign to Supress the Counter-revolutionary 
gradually ended towards the quarter of 1953. Violence, however, did not cease. On the 
contrary, as the CCP regime began to introduce the national ‘grain procumbent policy’ 
(centralised grain collection system), demanding set quotas of grain collection from across 
rural China from 1953, violence found a new context. Many local officials, who had become 
used to the practice of violence during the earlier revolutionary campaigns, took up violence 
as an instrument to force villagers to hand over ever more grain. On the other side, villagers 
took to violence as a necessary weapon for self-defence. In China’s agricultural heartland, 
Anhui province, for example, between 1953 and 1955, more than 32.5 percent of the total 
number of crimes were ‘crimes of sabotaging’ government’s grain procumbent policy.19  
 
Those saboteurs being caught were charged not according to their supposed crimes, but as 
counter-revolutionaries. The use of violence against them was thus further justified. Looting, 
physical torture, and public humiliation were some of the most common methods used. As 
                                                          
18Investigative report by Xichang and other backward regions party committee, From Xikang Regional Party 
Committee Archive, File JK1-1978, no page number.  
19 Anhui Difangzhi editorial department, Anhui Local History – Legal Section (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 
1997), p. 409.  
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with the Land Reform, many officials once again used grain procurement as a weapon to 
attack their rivals or to settle personal scores left over from previous eras. In Xikang 
province’s Huili County, more than half of the homes were looted, and many villagers 
suffered physical abuse. The methods of torture varied from hanging to beating, suffocation 
by smoke, and poisoning by forcing villager to swallow large dose of hemp. Sometimes, 
torture sessions would last as long as three days and three nights.20   
 
Direct personal violence and structural violence went hand in hand. As James Gilligan 
observed, it led to behaviour violence such as suicide.21 When the pressure to handover grain 
and the fear of physical torture became too great, when they had been denied human dignity, 
when they have no one to turn to for their grievances, many villagers turned their anger and 
the sense of helplessness into self-loathing and self-hatred. Some believed it was better to be 
a criminal than free as life in prison seemed a better and safer outcome than being constantly 
abused or being starved to death. 22 An even greater number were driven to commit suicide. 
In northwest Anhui’s Fuyang region, for example, within less than one month between 
December 1953 and January 1954, thrity-two villagers committed suicide because they could 
not endure the public humiliation or physical torture inflicted on them by local officials 
                                                          
20 Xikang Party Committee’s report on Grain Procumbent work (1953-5), From Xikang Regional Party 
Committee Archive, File JK1-2173, pp. 50-1. 
21 See James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p. 196; 
for study on structural violence see Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,’ Journal of Peace 
Research 6.3(1969), 167-91. 
22 Ya’an region’s special report on grain procumbent work (1954-5), From Xikang Regional Party Committee 
Archive, File JK1-2174, pp. 55-6. 
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during the grain procurement campaign.23 Suicide was not limited to one or two areas, or to 
the grain procumbent campaign. It had become a widespread phenomenon in the early years 
of the People’s Republic. Between 1954 and 1955, 512 cases of suicides or suicide attempts 
were reported to the central authority of the CCP. The frequency of suicide among the wider 
public had alerted the CCP’s political centre. Although Lu Dingyi, the man in charge of 
national political cultural work, who became the PRC’s first Minister of Propaganda, 
admitted that the CCP did not like the fact that so many people had committed suicide, in his 
address to the 18 provincial leaders’ meeting that year he insisted that ‘we should not let this 
hold us back. We must have confident. We must try to think positively. […] being petrified, 
lack of control, as well as lack of confident are the reasons behind high suicide rates. We 
must encourage the masses to participate in our national political culture. We must take total 
control. […] If we don’t win them over, they will join the enemies.’ He urged the provincial 
leaders, and ‘to win them over is to educate them over and over again.’24  
 
For the next thirty years, ‘thought reform’ dominated the everyday political culture of the 
PRC. As Wang Lishi, a survivor of the Great Leap Famine told me during an interview, 
‘there were just endless meetings in those days. We used to say that under Chiang Kai-shek 
there were endless taxes to pay, and under Chairman Mao there were endless meetings to 
attend. […] Every night they called us out to meetings. Only one or two nights when there 
                                                          
23 Fuyang regional party committee documents on grain procumbent work, from Fuyang Regional Party 
Committee archive, File J3-2-57, pp. 40-2. 
24 Lu Dingyi’s speech at eighteen provincial leader conference, From Xikang Regional Party Committee 
Archive, File JK1-3123, pp. 10-13. 
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was no campaign meeting could we get some rest. But the peace never lasted long. Soon, 
another campaign would begin.’25 
 
In the meantime the national grain procumbent policy persisted. In 1955, the CCP went ahead 
and launched the agricultural collectivisation in the Chinese countryside. As with the grain 
procurement policy, collectivisation was regularly met with contention. Violence was used as 
form of ‘power propaganda’ to realise the ideological claim in building the NEW socialist 
countryside or the future socialist utopian. While not all of local officials accepted the CCP’s 
ideological claims, many were intimidated into competing with each other. To outdo others 
many local officials used violence to whip unwilling individuals into joining agricultural 
collectives. By 1956, to Mao’s surprise, virtually all agricultural households in China had 
been organised into farming collectives. The use of violence was thus retrospectively 
‘justified’. 
 
Violence during the Great Leap Famine  
Once the CCP regime had completed or achieved its initial goals of Land Reform, the 
suppression of counter-revolutionaries as well as the initial stage of collectivisation through 
terror, the system quickly turned to against, not only its stated enemies, but against much 
wider sections of the population. From the end of 1957, as Mao and the top leadership pushed 
for the Great Leap Forward, the CCP inaugurated radical collectivisation in the Chinese 
countryside. Terror and violence were the foundation of the Great Leap Forward’. In the 
People’s Commune, the new and the highest form of administrative, economic, and political 
organization in rural China created to lead rural China into a ‘Communist Paradise’, terror, 
                                                          
25 Zhou Xun, Forgotten Voices of Mao’s Great Famine, 1958-1962: an Oral History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2013), pp. 89-91. 
 14 
repression, and violence were used directly against the Chinese peasantry, who had been 
among the CCP’s most loyal supporters before its claim to power. Organised violence was 
practiced as means of total control. The aim was to ‘kill one in order to deter one hundred,’ or, 
as a Chinese proverb says: ‘Kill the chicken to scare the monkey.’ 
 
From its outset, Mao conceived of the People’s Commune as an environment without legal 
safeguards, which operated strictly as a military organization, meaning that violence could be 
practiced with impunity. At the CCP ‘Enlarged Politburo conference’ in August 1958, Mao 
urged his colleagues that ‘we must re-establish our military tradition. It is Marxist tradition. 
Being boorish is good a thing. It shows we are sincere. Bourgeois politeness is deceitful. […] 
an orderly society is built on discipline. […] We don’t rely on civil or criminal law to ensure 
public order. […] The Soviet Union used force to collect grains. We have 22 years of military 
tradition.’26     
 
Echoing the chairman, Tan Zhenlin, the Minister of Agriculture, reminded provincial leaders 
that ‘last year we achieved high yield by giving forceful orders. […] This year, we need to 
pay more attention. We must fight with peasants. Cadres should continue giving forceful 
orders. The practice of giving forceful orders will continue for the next ten thousand years.  
[… ] this is not the best method, but it’s necessary.’27 
 
                                                          
26 Chairman Mao’s speeches at the August Enlarged Politburo Conference (August 17-30, 1958), from Hunan 
Provincial Party Committee archive, File 141-1-1036, pp. 27-30. 
27 Chairman Mao and other CCPC leaders’ conversations with provincial leaders (1958), From Hunan 
Provincial Party Committee archive, File 141-2- 62, p. 148. 
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Violence quickly turned into a normal practice in the People’s Commune. As violence 
permeated every aspects of daily life in the People’s Commune, for some the practice of 
violence became habituated or indeed, for some, an ‘addiction’. Once made into a habit, the 
act of violence no longer needed any intellectual rationale. In Guangdong province’s Huaiji 
County, for example, within four days one commune party secretary physically assaulted 
eleven people. Villagers called him the ‘tiger’. In their eyes, he no longer acted as a human 
but had turned a beast.28 Endless ‘struggle’ meetings provided opportunities for venting 
personal revenge. Local cadres used their positions of power to extract as much benefit for 
themselves as possible, while punishing anyone they disliked or with whom they disagreed. 
Villagers were also encouraged to ‘struggle’ against each other, and in some cases even 
family members fought one another. In Guangdong province in southern China, the practice 
of violence had reached an unprecedented level. As mentioned earlier, Guangdong has a long 
revolutionary tradition. The CCP was extremely active there from its earliest days, and in 
1927, China’s first rural Soviet base was established in Haifeng and Lufeng counties in 
eastern Guangdong. One legacy of Guangdong’s revolutionary culture was a propensity for 
political violence. With the People’s Communes, the region’s military tradition was restored 
by Mao’s order; oppressive control was revived. Violence became a routine practice. Local 
cadres as well as villagers were co-ordinated to take up violence against fellow villagers.  
Most communes set up their own prisons or labour camps. These were called ‘little prisons’. 
Commune or brigade officials, as well as villagers could arrest anyone they disliked by 
labelling them potential ‘saboteurs’ and put them in these little prisons. They needed no 
warrants. They only had to frame it as they were supporting the ‘General line’ or the People’s 
Commune. In Taishan County, one elderly woman aged in her sixties suffered poor health. 
                                                          
28 A report on several recent cases [of commune cadres] violating the law (June 1959). From Kaiping County 
Party Committee Archive, File 3- A0.09- 80, p. 5. 
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When she asked for permission to be absent from a commune’s celebration meeting, the local 
cadre forcefully brought her to the meeting where she came close to death spitting blood. In 
one commune, more than seventy villagers were locked up in the commune labour camp. 
Their crimes were that they were ‘disobedient’ and ‘wilful’. When the number of arrests had 
become so extensive that there was no longer any room to accommodate them, they were 
crowded into village toilets. Those under arrest were routinely tortured, beaten, and hanged. 
Common methods of torture included whipping with sticks; administering electric shocks; 
pouring boiling water over their heads; using red-hot metal to burn faces or bodies; forcing 
prisoners to kneel for long hours; mutilation such as scalping or chopping off ears; medieval 
style humiliations such as tattooing. In one commune in Luoding County, nearly a hundred 
villagers were clubbed to death. 29   
 
As the People’s Commune, the CCP’s so called ‘bridge to Communist paradise’, descended 
into the ‘people’s hell’, grain production plummeted. As of spring 1959 a severe famine took 
hold across rural China. The procurement system for the acquisition of grain and other 
agricultural products broke down across large sections of the country. But crop failure and 
famine conflicted with the state’s utopian vision of abundance. Mao and many top CCP 
leaders determined to win ‘the war’. On 22 February 1959, in a letter to provincial leaders, 
Mao suggested that the food shortage was a conspiracy: the peasants were hiding grain and 
this was due to corruption at the local level. To ‘take back the countryside’ and to ‘educate 
the peasants’, he gave orders to launch of the Anti- Hiding Campaign. A month later at a top 
                                                          
29 A report on several recent cases [of commune cadres] violating the law (June 1959). From Kaiping County 
Party Committee Archive, File 3- A0.09- 80, pp. 5– 6; 42. 
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CCP leaders’ meeting in Shanghai (25 March 25 to 1 April), Mao again urged the leadership 
to ‘be relentless’ toward the peasants and to procure ‘a third’ of the total crop produced. 30 
 
A nationwide ‘Anti-Hiding Campaign’ was launched. It soon turned into a crusade against 
peasants. Under pressure from their superiors, provincial leaders turned on those at the level 
immediately below them. As the popular Chinese saying goes, ‘The big fish eats the small 
fish, the small fish eats the little shrimp, and the little shrimp eats nothing but sand.’ At the 
local level, cadres made up false production figures showing praiseworthy success. This led 
to the ever-increasing procurement quotas based on the false figures. When they failed to 
procure the projected amounts, local cadres forced starving peasants to hand over their very 
last kernels of grain and to work day and night in scorching summer and freezing winter. 
Anyone who did not follow orders was severely punished. Many were tortured or starved to 
death. In some counties in Shandong province, villagers caught hiding grain were treated as 
saboteurs or ‘American devils’. In Dan County, more than one third of the families were 
looted. Local villagers commented that the CCP policy was worse than the wartime Japanese 
army’s Three All Policy (burn all, kill all, and loot all). In Juye County, when one female 
villager asked for a leave to take care of her sick child, the brigade head refused by saying: ‘If 
he dies we could save 180 kg of grain, and his corpse could be used as fertiliser.’31  
 
In the aftermath of the CCP’s Lushan Plenum in late July and early August 1959, Mao 
silenced the critical voices of the Great Leap Forward within the CCP leadership, and pushed 
                                                          
30 Chairman Mao’s words at the Shanghai Conference (25 March 1959), from Gansu Provincial Party 
Committee archive, File 91-18-494, pp. 44-8.  
31 Report from Tian Qilang and Wang Ying regarding the food crisis and oedema Jining region (April 1959), 
from Shandong Provincial Party Committee archive, File A001-01-465, pp. 26-8. 
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the campaign even harder. Violence intensified across the countryside. At the local level, 
public meetings became the platform for the promotion of terror and the site for decisions 
about its execution. A mass campaign, engineered by the Party under the Three Red Banners 
(Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune), turned into a 
‘beating frenzy.’ It spread across the country at terrifying speed. Sichuan province, the 
proverbial land of abundance, was led by the provincial Party boss Li Jingquan, whom Mao 
once called more ruthless than even the earlier regional warlords. Having gotten to his 
position by being brutal, Li was keen to take up the public practice of mass violence for his 
own career interests. Early in the spring in 1959, serious food shortages afflicted the Sichuan 
countryside. But Li was only interested in receiving continuous praise from top CCP leaders 
in Beijing for Sichuan’s continuous and generous provision of grain to the rest of country. He 
launched a ‘Balance the Books Campaign’ in March to achieve unrealistically high 
procurement quotas. This was part of the nationwide ‘Anti-Hiding Campaign’, accompanied 
by the ‘Rectification Campaign’. Rectification, however, did not clean up corruption among 
the cadres. It enabled open looting of peasants’ homes and the theft of the very last reserves 
of food they possessed. When no grain was found, peasants were physically torture or being 
punished by total food deprivation. In eastern Sichuan’s Shizhu County, a county not far from 
prosperous Chongqing, more than 70 percent of the local population in the Xianfeng Big 
Brigade of the county’s model Huaban commune were battered during the ‘Balance the 
Books Campaign’. Here local cadres took pride in beating villagers up. Indeed special 
‘people-beating squads’ were set up. Local cadres even encouraged children to attack other 
children. Between mid-1959 and mid-1961, Shizhu County had an average death rate as high 
as 60 percent. While the majority of those who died did so as the result of starvation, many 
were also beaten to death. In nearby Fuling County the situation was no better. Take the 
Baozi Commune, for example. This was once considered Fuling’s granary. With its lush 
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green terraced fields, the area had produced such an abundance of food that over 2.5 million 
kg of grain were sent to the state granary in 1958. But in 1959 and the first half of 1960, the 
death rate there was as high as 29 percent. By January 1961 the population had dropped by 46 
percent compared to 1957. The majority were either beaten to death or died of food 
deprivation during the ‘Anti-Hiding Campaign’. In Qinglong Big Brigade, for example, in 
December 1959, the Anti-Hiding activists meeting lasted for 6 days and nights. During this 
protracted public ordeal villagers were repeatedly beaten. Some were club to death in the 
meeting and many more were severely injured as result. One former village cadre, an 
opponent of the acting brigade head, was so brutally tortured he was driven completely 
insane.32 In Youyang County, an official estimate found that 359 people had been beaten to 
death in less than a year during the ‘Anti-Hiding Campaign’. In Youyang’s Longtan district, 
the local party secretary knocked out more 80 villagers’ teeth and beat one four-year-old 
child to death for having eaten a small amount of sweet potato. A government investigative 
report shows that he had beaten every child in the district during the campaign.33  
 
Humiliation inflicted as much pain as torture. In traditional China, public humiliation was 
used as a form of punishment. Under the Maoist regime humiliation was an essential tool for 
carrying out political violence and it was widely practiced in the People’s Commune. In the 
                                                          
32 A report on how ordinary peasants from Qinglong big brigade in Baozi commune were encouraged to expose 
[corruption] and seize power (January 1961), from the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee 
Archive, File JC 1- 2068, pp. 1–3. 
33 Comrade Liang Qishan from Sichuan Provincial Administrative Office’s report on reification and famine 
relief work in Fuling region (1961), from Sichuan Provincial Party Committee archive, File JC 001-2605, p. 72; 
Comrade Yang Wanxuan from Sichuan Provincial Administrative Office’s report on reification and agricultural 
production work in Fuling region (1961), from Sichuan Provincial Party Committee archive, File JC 001-2606, 
p. 3. 
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name of Anti-hiding, women in Shandong’s Juye County were regularly raped or publically 
humiliated by being forced to stand naked if they were suspected of hiding grain or could not 
work in the fields due to menstruation.34 
 
In time of scarcity, food was a more powerful weapon than torture. Food deprivation was a 
common method used by local cadres to force villagers to work harder or to extract more 
food. While the total number of people died of food deprivation during the Great Leap famine 
is hard to obtain due to the continued restriction of accessing archival material, from those 
examples gathered from local archives we learn this was a widespread problem. Take eastern 
Sichuan, for example, between 1959 and 1961, in one commune in Hechuan County 496 
people died an abnormal death. Amongst those who died, forty-two were hanged or buried 
alive or frightened to death; sixty-two were beaten to death, while 392 died of food 
deprivation.35  
 
What makes the Great Leap Famine in Mao’s China different from famines in late imperial 
China and the brief time of the Chinese Republic is the extraordinary level of violence that 
was meted out during the famine. In the pursuit of the CCP’s utopian vision to transform the 
Chinese countryside into a communist paradise, an estimate between 2 to 3 million people 
were tortured to death or deliberately killed between 1958 and 1961.36 Some of these were 
buried alive; others were beaten to death; even more were starved to death by deliberate food 
                                                          
34 Report from Tian Qilang and Wang Ying regarding the food crisis and oedema Jining region (April 1959), 
from Shandong Provincial Party Committee archive, File A001-01-465, p. 28. 
35 Sichuan Provincial Administrative Office and the work team’s report the situation in Jiangjin (1960), from 
Sichuan Provincial Party Committee archive, File JC 001-2609, p. 114. 
36 For further discussion on the figure see Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: the History of China’s most 
Devastating Catastrophe (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 298. 
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deprivation. As with the earlier campaigns, the majority of those victims had done nothing 
wrong themselves: some happened to have been born into the ‘wrong class’, and others 
simply fell victim of lawless environment where privilege and cronyism were the only ways 
to survive. For most of local cadres who committed violent crimes, there was often no 
ideological conviction or specifically evil motives. As Hannah Arendt famously argued, ‘the 
sad truth that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.’ 
When the practice of violence became a habit in the People’s Commune, it needed no 
intellectual or moral justification. Like all habits, it could be learnt over time.   
 
Once they had been deprived of their dignity as well as their rights to live a human life, some 
began to live as criminals or indeed even as savages. The Chinese countryside turned into an 
even more violent world. Robbery, theft, murder and cannibalism were regularly reported 
between 1959 and 1961. According to an incomplete estimate by the Ministry of Public 
Security, from September 1960 to 25 January 1961, there were 30,000 incidents of gang 
robbery of state granaries in twenty-three different provinces and regions throughout China. 
Railways across the country had become the main battle field. Train robbery became a 
‘weapon of the weak’, a survival strategy in time of famine. Starving villagers carrying 
knives routinely robbed passing trains carrying grain and goods. In Gansu alone, the Public 
Security reported more than 500 incidents of train robbery.37 In Shandong province, famous 
for the Boxer sectarian violence at turn of the twentieth century, sectarian groups were active 
again. They put out slogans such as: ‘To have enough to eat, we must unite together to kill 
cadres and rob granaries.’ In southern and southwestern China, there also saw a revival of 
sectarian activities. There were regular reports of sectarian followers storming the local 
                                                          
37 Zhou Xun, The Great Famine in China, 1958-1962: A Documentary History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012), p. 127-9.  
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Public Security and furnishing themselves with armoury. Saw the famine was a sign that the 
CCP had lost the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, they killed local CCP officials and hailed to go to 
Beijing to overthrow the CCP government. To suppress these ‘counter-revolutionary 
sabotages’ led to many violent clashes between the PLA soldiers and followers of sectarian 
groups.38 In parts of the country, cannibalism became so widespread. In Linxia autonomous 
region in Gansu province, for instance, where there had been violent clashes between the 
Chinese officials and the Hui ethnic group during which thousands were massacred (as 
mentioned earlier), more than fifty instances of cannibalism were uncovered in one 
municipality between late 1959 and the following summer. While the majority consumed the 
flesh of villagers who has died as a result of starvation, five villagers also murdered victims 
before consuming their flesh. One even killed his own younger brother and ate his flesh. 
Faraway from Gansu, in Sichuan’s Fuling region as well as in parts of Guizhou in southwest 
of China, cannibalism was regularly reported. Here again, it was often children who became 
victims of human scavengers. On one occasion, a desperate mother strangled her own son to 
death and consumed his flesh.39 In Henan’s Xinyang region, China’s agricultural heartland 
and the birth place of the People’s Commune, villagers in Guanshan County told me that 
every village had cases of cannibalism.40    
 
                                                          
38 Zhou Xun, The Great Famine in China, pp. 105-7; 112-3; Wuchuan Gelao and Miao Autonomous County 
Gazette (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2001), p. 40; Zhunyi City Gazette (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
1998), p. 63; Guizhou Provincial Gazette (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2007), p. 451; Shizu County 
Gazette (Chengdu: Sichuan chishu chubanshe, 1994), p. 25; The CCP Chronicle of Major Events in Sichuan 
(Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1998), p. 206; Lushan County Gazette (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 
2000), pp. 28-9. 
39 Zhou Xun, The Great Famine in China, pp. 59-71.  
40 Zhou Xun, Forgotten Voices of Mao’s Great Famine, pp. 258-60. 
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The systematic violence that haunted the PRC during the Mao era was not merely the result 
of a series of unplanned and disconnected events. Violence was a state weapon used to 
implement radical political changes aiming toward a perfect, utopian state that is free of mass 
violence. Once such practices were built into the system, violence became habituated, and 
therefore beyond any justification. The restraints against mass violence that had been inherent 
in China because of the alterations in the scope of Imperial and then Republican state control, 
as well as under the warlords, of violence as a state weapon which resulted in the breakdown 
in the Confucian ideals that underpinned such controls on the level of the individual. This 
meant that it became easier and easier to instrumentalise violence for a wide range of 
purposes, both public and private, under Mao’s leadership. Thus, violence in the PRC took a 
wide range of forms and was not necessarily ‘top-down’. From torture and beatings to public 
humiliation and starvation, violence became the common coin of human interaction in the 
PRC. It became a vocabulary through which state policy was seen as validated and thus also 
became simultaneously a means by which individual interests and desires could also be 
fulfilled. The PRC under Mao’s leadership became defined by violence on every level, well 
exceeding Marx’s pessimistic view of the nature of revolution in 1848. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ESSAY  
VIOLENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA: 1949-1963 
 
Zhou Xun  
 
Until the 1990s, due restricted access to the party archives and other essential primary 
sources, there had been no in-depth analysis that scrutinizes violence in revolutionary China. 
Scholars studying the history of the PRC, who relied on the published works, could do little 
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more than providing a broad view that, to a large extent, echoed the CCP’s official 
historiography. This coincided with the period, a decade leading up to as well as after 
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, when a group of Westerners, including some China specialists, 
took an increasingly sympathetic view of the PRC. They often credited the CCP with 
establishing a stable government after decades of war and political turmoil. This began as a 
counter-trend that quickly took momentum in the wake of the Vietnam War. This positive 
image of the Chinese Communist revolution and the achievements in the PRC was a useful 
weapon in their criticism aimed against America’s military aggression in Southeast Asia. 
After the death of Mao, however, in the late 1970s and early 80s, the stories of persecutions 
of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution years (1966 -1976) began to challenge this 
earlier positive image. The background for this was the 1981 Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee’s (CPCC) ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party’ 
that divided the history of the PRC into pre and post 1957. In this modified version of 
Chinese historiography, the years before 1957 were depicted as the ‘Golden Years’ of the 
PRC, during which the CCP and the PRC government had successfully accomplished Land 
Reform and embarked on the First Five-Year Plan that foreshowed the rapid and non-violent 
agricultural collectivization from 1955 to 1956. Western as well as Chinese scholarship 
quickly adopted the CPCC’s 1957 division. This was further supported by an increasing 
number of autobiographical and fictional texts on the Cultural Revolution that were published 
in and outside of China. They re-enforced the official view that the Cultural Revolution was 
the disastrous period of the PRC history.  
 
This position began to change in 1989 when the news of armed violence against unarmed 
students on Tiananmen Square shocked the world. Gradually in the 1990s, a bleaker picture 
of the pre-1957 PRC history began to appear. An increasing number of Chinese as well as 
 25 
Western scholars began to challenge the image of the pre-1957 ‘Golden Years’. In the 1990s, 
in part triggered by similar developments in the former Soviet Union and its East European 
ex-satellites, changes took place in the PRC archives. The 1990 new archival regulation 
(revised in May 1999) theoretically made documents more than thirty years old available for 
the public access.  In practice, however, a great number of documents were and are still 
classified as ‘unsuitable’ for public access and are remained as ‘closed’ files. After autumn 
2012, greater restrictions were introduced by the State Archives Administration of China 
(SAAC), which made it difficult for researchers to read documents from the period of 1949 to 
1979. The short window of openness between 1990s and 2012, however, allowed Chinese as 
well as western scholars in the humanities and social sciences access to a great mass of 
declassified original party and other sources on the PRC’s first three decades. This newly 
unearthed information, often in conjunction with newly available documentary materials in 
other countries, transformed the ability to study, understand, and explain the social, economic 
and political history of the PRC under Mao. This resulted in a far more critical view of the 
Chinese Communist Revolution and the early PRC history. In this re-appraisal, we learn that 
coercion and violence existed throughout the Mao era from the early PRC to the end of the 
Cultural Revolution.  Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden’s Revolution, 
Resistance, and Reform in Village China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), for 
example, showed us that during and after the Great Leap Famine (1958-1962), intra- and inter 
village clashes erupted and spilled over into violence. It continued into the Cultural 
Revolution, when violence peaked throughout the countryside. At the same time, Yang 
Kuisong’s ‘Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries’ allowed the 
English reader to see that how violence was an essential tool used by the CCP regime to 
maintain its fragile power in the early 1950s after the Liberation [Yang, ‘Reconsidering the 
Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,’ The China Quarterly 193 (2008), 104-120]. 
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Frank Dikötter’s major history of the Great Leap Famine Mao’s Great Famine: The History 
of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe (London: Bloomsbury, 2010) argued that violence 
was the very foundation of the Great Leap Forward. There was widespread of violence on the 
local level throughout the famine period. The argument presented by Dikötter was further re-
enforced by Zhou Xun ’s companion volumes. Using first hand oral interviews of the 
survivors as well as previously unseen party archival documents, Zhou Xun’s Forgotten 
Voices of Mao’s Great Famine: An Oral History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) 
and The Great Famine of China, 1958-62: A Documentary History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012) allowed reader to see for themselves that the sheer violence that took 
place during the Great Leap Forward famine was beyond doubt.   
